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In 1972 theUK government ﬂoated the poundwhile pursuing highly
expansionary ﬁscal policies whose aim was to reduce rising unemploy-
ment. To control inﬂation the government introduced statutory wage
and price controls. Monetary policy was given no targets for either the
money supply or inﬂation; interest rates were held at rates that would
accommodate growth and falling unemployment. Since wage and
price controls would inevitably break down faced with the inﬂationary
effects of such policies, this period appears to ﬁt rather well with the
policy requirements of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: ﬁscal policy
appears to have been non-Ricardian (not limited by concerns with sol-
vency) and monetary policy accommodative to inﬂation - in the lan-
guage of Leeper (1991) ﬁscal policy was ‘active’ and monetary policy
was ‘passive’. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that this pol-
icy regimewould come to an end: both Conservative and Labour parties
won elections in the 1970s and both pursued essentially the sameric Leeper and economics sem-
ies, for useful comments on an
ining errors.
Cardiff Business School, Columpolicies. While Margaret Thatcher won the Conservative leadership in
1975 and also the election in 1979, during the period we study here it
was not assumed that the monetarist policies she advocated would
ever occur, since theywere opposed by the two other parties, by a pow-
erful group in her own party, as well as by the senior civil service. Only
after her election and her actual implementation of themwas this a rea-
sonable assumption. So it appears that in the period from 1972 to 1979
there was a prevailing policy regime which was expected to continue.
These are key assumptions about the policy environment; besides this
narrative backgroundwe also check themempirically below. Besides in-
vestigating behaviour in the 1970s, we go on to investigate the behav-
iour of the Thatcher regime in the 1980s, to test the popular
assumption that this regime greatly changed the conduct of macro-
economic policy. According to this assumption there was a shift of re-
gime towards ‘monetarist’ policy, inwhichmonetary policy became ‘ac-
tive’ and ﬁscal policy became ‘passive’ (or ‘Ricardian’). Thus we broaden
our analysis to put the 1970s episode into the context of the evolution of
macroeconomic policy over this whole dramatic period of UK history.
Under FTPL the price level or inﬂation is determined by the need to
impose ﬁscal solvency; thus it is set so that the market value of out-
standing debt equals the expected present value of future primary sur-
pluses. The FTPL has been set out and developed in Leeper (1991); Sims
(1994); Woodford (1998a, 2001) and Cochrane (2001, 2005) - see also
comments by McCallum (2001, 2003) and Buiter (1999, 2002), and for
Table 1
Summary of the FTPL and Orthodox models.
Common equations
IS curve yt−yt ¼ Etðytþ1−ytþ1Þ− 1σ ðRst−Etπtþ1Þ þ errISt
Phillips curve πt=θ(yt−yt⁎)+βEtπt+1+errtPP
Productivity yt⁎−yt−1⁎=cy⁎+γ(yt−1⁎−yt−2⁎)+errty⁎
Distictive equations FTPL Orthodox
Fiscal policy Δ(gt−tt)=errtg−t Δ(gt− tt)=−δ(g− t)t−1−cg−t]+errtg−t'
Inﬂation determination πt=κ(gt− tt)+cπ+errtpi Rts=(1−ρ)[rss+ϕππt+ϕxgap(yt−yt⁎)]+ρRt−1s +errtR
S
Note: all equation errors are assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
Table 2
204 J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218surveys Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999); Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000)
and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). Empirical tests have been pro-
posed by Bohn (1998); Canzoneri et al. (2001) and Bajo-Rubio et al.
(2014). Loyo (2000) for example argues that Brazilian policy in the
late 1970s and early 1980s was non-Ricardian and that the FTPL pro-
vides a persuasive explanation for Brazil's high inﬂation during that
time. Thework of Tanner and Ramos (2003) also ﬁnds evidence of ﬁscal
dominance for the case of Brazil for some important periods. Cochrane
(1999, 2005) argues that the FTPLwith a statistically exogenous surplus
process explains the dynamics of U.S. inﬂation in the 1970s. This ap-
pears to be similar to what we see in the UK during the 1970s. In addi-
tion, there has been extensive work on FTPL in monetary unions1 and
speciﬁcally on European economies.2
Our aim in this paper is to test the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
(FTPL) as applied to the UK in the 1970s episode we described above;
and to contrast it with the apparently very different policy in the
1980s. Cochrane (1999, 2001, 2005) has noted that there is a basic iden-
tiﬁcation problem affecting the FTPL: in the FTPL ﬁscal policy is exoge-
nous and forces inﬂation to produce ﬁscal solvency. But similar
economic behaviour can be consistent with an exogenous monetary
policy determining inﬂation in the ‘orthodox’way, with Ricardian ﬁscal
policy endogenously responding to the government budget constraint
to ensure solvency given that inﬂation path - what we will call the Or-
thodox model. Thus there is a besetting problem in the empirical litera-
ture we have cited above, that equations that appear to reﬂect the FTPL
and are used to ‘test’ it, could also be implied by theOrthodox set-up. To
put it more formally the reduced form or solved representation of an
FTPL model may in form be indistinguishable from that of an orthodox
model; this is true of both single-equation implications of the model
and complete solutions of it.
As Bajo-Rubio et al. (2014) note, the tests are focused on the
government's intertemporal budget constraint. In the ‘backward-
looking’ version (Bohn, 1998) for the government to be Ricardian the
government primary surplus should react positively to lagged debt;
this can be tested for by checking the cointegration of revenue and
spending with a unit coefﬁcient. In the ‘forward-looking’ version due
to Canzoneri et al. (2001), the future level of debt should react negative-
ly to the current primary surplus. Here the test is of the impulse re-
sponse function of debt to the surplus, but Bajo-Robio et al. point out
that if a primary surplus today causes a lower primary surplus tomor-
row the test would not hold. This version too requires cointegration to
hold.
The cointegration test needs in principle to include inﬂation-tax rev-
enues. But these revenues include the reduction in value of the debt due
to inﬂation which are precisely those generated by FTPL to ensure sol-
vency. As solvency is always assured in equilibrium in either Ricardian
or FTPL conditions, so cointegration must hold in either condition; and1 See for example Sims (1997); Woodford (1998b); Bergin (2000); Canzoneri et al.
(2001), and Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009).
2 See Mèlitz (2000); Afonso (2000); Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Bajo-
Rubio et al. (2014).so, while interpretation is possible, there is strictly speaking no way of
distinguishing which condition is causing this to happen.
As a result of this critique, some authors - for example Bianchi
(2012); Bianchi andMelosi (2013) - have abandoned the idea of testing
whether the FTPL was or was not prevailing in an episode. Instead they
have assumed that various possible combinations ofﬁscal andmonetary
policy were operating at different times, with switching between them
occurring according to someMarkov process. They have then estimated,
usually by Bayesian methods, what combinations were operating and
when. In the context of the US, to which most of this work is devoted
and where the constitution divides power between three branches of
government, this idea that at any one time there is not necessarily a def-
inite ‘regime’ operating but rather a constant process of ﬂux between
transitory regimes may well seem plausible. However, our paper inves-
tigates a speciﬁc episode in UK history; and the UK is a unitary state
where there is no separation of executive powers and where an elected
government is - until the next election - the sole setter of policy. Our
brief description of the history of the 1970s above suggests that during
this period FTPLmay well have been the sole operating regime; it is the
aim of this paper to test this hypothesis in a convincing way. The epi-
sode gives us the unusual opportunity to do this. If we could succeed
in this objective,wewould have answered an important empirical ques-
tion: could FTPL ever have actually happened and therefore is it more
than a theoretical curiosum?
We meet the identiﬁcation critique head on in this paper by setting
up speciﬁc versions of both the two models, FTPL and Orthodox, and
testing each against the data. We ﬁrst establish that, even though
these twomodels may produce similar reduced forms, they are identiﬁ-
able by the detailed differences within these reduced forms and cannot
therefore be confused wth each other. Secondly, we follow a compre-
hensive testing procedure; we use Bayesian estimation, and rank the
twomodels using various priors.We ﬁnd that we cannot unambiguous-
ly rank thesemodels regardless of the priors we use.We also try to rank
them using the widely-used Likelihood Ratio test, using ﬂat priors; but
these rankings are unstable, apparently reﬂecting a rather ﬂat likelihood
function. Our principal test is to examine the models' ability to repro-
duce the data behaviour, which can be represented by impulse response
functions ormoments and cross-moments but whichwe represent par-
simoniously here by the features of a VECM; this is the little-known
method of ‘indirect inference’, whose power is high as a test, even in
the rather small sample we have here.
Thus the contribution of this paper is to use full information econo-
metric methods to test two rival structural models of the economy, one
according to the FTPL approach and one according to the OrthodoxIdentiﬁcation check: FTPL vs Orthodox Taylor.
When the true model is Rejection rate (at 95% conﬁdence level)
of the false model
FTPL 24.5% (Orthodox)
Orthodox 22.2% (FTPL)
Fig. 1. UK Data (1972–1979).
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1980s.
To anticipate our ﬁndings, we cannot reject either hypothesis for the
1970s; however we show that we can create a combination of the two
models which greatly dominates either model on its own but still
gives an important role to ﬁscal policy in determining inﬂation in this
period. For the 1980s the same combinationmodel again improves sub-
stantially on the individual models (which again cannot be individually
rejected) and gives a continued, though much diminished, role to ﬁscal
policy. These results make sense of the important position that ﬁscal
policy occupied in the UK inﬂation debates during these two decades.
Our paper is organised as follows.We review thehistory of UKpolicy
during the 1970s in Section 2; in this section we establish a narrative
that suggests the FTPL could have been at work. In Section 3 we set up
a particularmodel of FTPL thatwe argue could be a candidate to explain
this UK episode; side by side with it we set out a particular rival ‘Ortho-
dox’ model in which monetary policy is governed by a Taylor Rule and
ﬁscal policy is Ricardian. In Section 4we discuss the data and the results
of our testing procedure. In Section 5we compare our results with those
for the 1980s. Section 6 concludes.Table 3
Indirect estimates of the FTPL and the Orthodox models.
Model parameter Starting value FTPL Orthodox Taylor
θ 2.4 4.07 1.96
β 0.99 ﬁxed ﬁxed
σ 2.27 0.02 0.46
κ 0.26 0.35 –
ρ 0.5 – 0.76
ϕπ 2 – 1.31
ϕxgap 0.125 – 0.06
δ 0.003 – 0.007
cy⁎ 0.0002 ﬁxed ﬁxed
γ 0.99 ﬁxed ﬁxed
Shock persistence (rho's)
errpp – 0.43 0.42
errIS – 0.64 0.84
erry⁎ – 0.93 0.93
errg−t – −0.1 −0.1
errπ – 0.24 –
errR
S
– – 0.332. The nature of UK policy during the 1970s
FromWWII until its breakdown in 1970 the Bretton Woods system
governed the UK exchange rate and hence its monetary policy. While
exchange controls gave some moderate freedom to manage interest
rates away from foreign rates without the policy being overwhelmed
by capital movements, such freedom was mainly only for the short
term; the setting of interest rates was dominated in the longer term
by the need to control the balance of payments sufﬁciently to hold the
sterling exchange rate. Pegging the exchange rate implied that the
price level was also pegged to the foreign price level. Through this
mechanism monetary policy ensured price level determinacy. Fiscal
policy was therefore disciplined by the inability to shift the price level
from this trajectory and also by the consequentﬁxing of the home inter-
est rate to the foreign level. While this discipline could in principle be
overthrownbyﬁscal policy forcing a series of devaluations, the evidence
suggests that this did not happen; therewere just two devaluations dur-
ing the whole post-war period up to 1970, in 1949 and 1967. On both
occasions a Labour government viewed the devaluation as a one-off
change permitting a brief period of monetary and ﬁscal ease, to be
followed by a return to the previous regime.
However, after the collapse of BrettonWoods, the UKmoved in a se-
ries of steps to a ﬂoating exchange rate. Initially sterling was ﬁxed to
continental currencies through a European exchange rate system
known as ‘the snake in the tunnel’, designed to hold rates within a gen-
eral range (the tunnel) and if possible even closer (the snake). Sterling
proved difﬁcult to keep within these ranges, and was in practice keptFig. 2. IRFs - Output (FTPL).
Fig. 3. IRFs - Inﬂation (FTPL). Fig. 5. IRFs - Real int. rates (FTPL).
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Finally it was formally ﬂoated in June 1972.
UK monetary policy was not given a new nominal target to replace
the exchange rate. Instead the Conservative government of Edward
Heath assigned the determination of inﬂation to wage and price con-
trols. A statutory ‘incomes policy’ was introduced in late 1972. After
the 1974 election the incoming Labour government set up a ‘voluntary
incomes policy’, buttressed by food subsidies and cuts in indirect tax
rates. Fiscal policy was expansionary until 1975 and monetary policy
was accommodative, with interest rates kept low to encourage falling
unemployment. In 1976 the Labour government invited the IMF to sta-
bilise the falling sterling exchange rate; the IMF terms included the set-
ting of targets for Domestic Credit Expansion. Thesewere largelymet by
a form of control on deposits (the ‘corset’) which forced banks to reduce
deposits in favour of other forms of liability. But by 1978 these restraints
had effectively been abandoned and prices and incomes controls rein-
stated in the context of a pre-election ﬁscal and monetary expansion -
see Minford (1993); Nelson (2003) and Meenagh et al. (2009b) for
further discussions of the UK policy environment for this and other
post-war UK periods.
Our description of policy suggests that the role of the nominal
anchor for inﬂation may have been played during the 1970s by ﬁscal
policy, if only because monetary policy was not given this task and
was purely accommodative. Thus this episode appears on the face of it
to be a good candidate for FTPL to apply.
3. An FTPL Model for the UK in the 1970s
In what followswe set out a simple particularmodel of the FTPL that
captures key aspects of UK behaviour. The model is a New Keynesian
model as set out in Clarida et al. (1999): there is a labour-only produc-
tion function among ﬁrms supplying intermediate goods under imper-
fect competition and Calvo pricing, retail bundlers turn these goods
into ﬁnal products under perfect competition, households have utility
over consumption and leisure and all agents have rational expectations.
This standard set-up is used because it is empirically successful (e.g. Liu
and Minford, 2014) and enables us to focus our attention on the role ofFig. 4. IRFs - Nom. int. rates (FTPL).government behaviour. The UK is an open economy but during all our
sample period it ﬂoated the pound and this is well-known to generate
behaviour close to that of a closed economy. We now turn to the gov-
ernment budget constraint and ﬁscal policy under FTPL. In the next sec-
tion we will outline the alternative Ricardian model.
We assume that the UKﬁnances its deﬁcit by issuing nominal perpe-
tuities, each paying one pound per period and whose present value is
therefore 1Rtwhere Rt is the long-term rate of interest. We use perpetui-
ties here rather than the usual one-period bond because of the prepon-
derance of long-term bonds in the UK debt issue: the average maturity
of UK debt at this timewas approximately ten years but a model with a
realistic maturity structurewould lose tractability. All bonds at this time
were nominal (indexed bonds were not issued until 1981).
The government budget constraint can then be written as:
Btþ1
Rt
¼ Gt−Tt þ Bt þ BtRt ð1Þ
where Gt is government spending in money terms, Tt is government
taxation in money terms, Bt is the number of perpetuities issued. Note
that when perpetuities are assumed the debt interest in period t is Bt
while the stock of debt at the start of period t has the value during the
period of BtRt; end-period debt therefore has the value
Btþ1
Rt
. Note too the
perpetuity interest rate is by construction expected to remain constant
into the future.
We can derive the implied value of current bonds outstanding by
substituting forwards for future bonds outstanding:
Bt
Rt
¼ Et
X∞
i¼0
Ttþi−Gtþið Þ 1
1þ Rtð Þiþ1
ð2Þ
We now deﬁne each period's expected ‘permanent’ tax and spend-
ing share, tt and gt , such that∑
∞
i¼0 EtTtþi
1
ð1þRt Þiþ1
¼ tt∑∞i¼0 EtPtþiytþi
1
ð1þRt Þiþ1
and ∑∞i¼0 EtGtþi
1
ð1þRtÞiþ1
¼ gt∑∞i¼0 EtPtþiytþi 1ð1þRtÞiþ1 . Thus
these two shares summarise the key ﬁscal settings, in the same way
that a consumer's permanent income replaces the consumer's complex
incomeprospectswith a constant streamof incomewith the same pres-
ent value. It is a feature of such permanent variables (a class to which
the perpetuity interest rate also belongs since it is the expected averageTable 4
Variance decomposition (FTPL).
Unit: % y π Rs r
errIS: 0 0 23.1 99.9
errPP: 79.1 0 0 0.1
errπ: 2.2 67.1 8 0
erry⁎: 18.7 0 0 0
errg−t: 0 32.9 68.9 0
Total: 100 100 100 100
Fig. 6. IRFs - Output (Orthodox Taylor). Fig. 9. IRFs - Real int. rates (Orthodox Taylor).
207J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218of all future one-period interest rates) that they follow a random walk-
Hall (1978). We will exploit this feature in what follows, both to devel-
op a parsimonious version of this model's behaviour and to distinguish
this model from the Orthodox model.
(2) becomes:
Bt
Rt
¼ tt−gtð Þ∑∞i¼0 EtPtþiytþi
1
1þ Rtð Þiþ1
Now deﬁne πt ; γt as the expected permanent growth rates of Pt ; yt ,
respectively the equilibriumor ‘trend’ price and output levels, such that.
∑∞i¼0 EtPtþiytþi
1
ð1þRt Þiþ1
¼ Ptyt∑∞i¼0 ð1þγtþ
πt Þi
ð1þRt Þ1þi:
Note that if γt andπt are both small enough and because by the Fisher
equationwe can deﬁne the riskless real perpetuities interest rate as rt⁎=
Rt−πt , we can rewrite:
∑∞i¼0
1þ γt þ πtð Þ1þi
1þ Rtð Þ1þi
¼∑∞i¼0
1
1þ Rt−γt−πt
 1þi
¼ 1
1−
1
1þ rt−γt
−1
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼ 1rt−γt
 Fig. 8. IRFs - Nom. int. rates (Orthodox Taylor).
Fig. 7. IRFs - Inﬂation (Orthodox Taylor).Hence (2) now can be rewritten as:
Bt
RtPtyt
¼ tt−gt
 
1þ γt þ πtð Þ rt−γtð Þ
ð3Þ
Thepricing condition on bonds in Eq. (3) thus sets their value consis-
tently with expected future primary surpluses. Suppose now the gov-
ernment reduces the present value of future primary surpluses. At an
unchanged real value of the debt this would be a ‘non-Ricardian’ ﬁscal
policy move. According to the FTPL prices will adjust to reduce the
real value of the debt to ensure that the solvency condition is met.
This is to be comparedwith the normal Ricardian situation, inwhichﬁs-
cal surpluses are endogenous so that ﬁscal shocks today lead to adjust-
ments in future surpluses, the price level remaining unaffected.
Since the pricing equation sets the ratio of debt value toGDP equal to
a function of permanent variables, it follows that this ratio bt follows a
random walk3 such that:
bt ¼ Bt
RtPtyt
¼ Etbtþ1 ð4Þ
and
Δbt ¼ ηt ð5Þ
which is an i . i .d.process.
This in turn allows us to solve for the inﬂation shock as a function of
other shocks (especially shocks to government tax and spending).With
the number of government bonds issued, Bt,being pre-determined (is-
sued last period) and therefore known at t−1, Eq. (3) could be written
as follows (taking logs and letting logxtue= logxt−Et−1logxt, the unex-
pected change in logxt):
logbuet ¼− logRuet − logP
ue
t − logy
ue
t LHS of equation 3ð Þ½ 
¼ log tt−gt
 ue− log 1þ πt þ γtð Þue
− log rt−γt
 ue RHS of equation 3ð Þ½ 
ð6Þ
In considering empirically how these unanticipated terms should be
evaluated, we ﬁrst note that the expected underlying growth rate will
be estimated as a function of the drift term (the constant) in the
estimated equation for Δ logyt⁎ (as exempliﬁed below in our empirical
section where it is found to be best treated as an I(1) variable –
Eq. (15) below); hence we assume it will not change from period to
period in this short sample of less than a decade and so treat γt ¼ γ, a
constant. With all the variables in the equation deﬁned to follow a
random walk (or in the case of yt⁎ an I(1) process of the form
Δ logyt⁎=γΔ logyt−1⁎+ cy⁎+errty⁎), and approximating unexpected
changes in actual and permanent inﬂation as equal (so that for small3 A ‘permanent’ variable xt is by deﬁnition a variable expected not to change in the fu-
ture so that Etxtþ1 ¼ xt. Thusxtþ1 ¼ xt þ εtþ1, where εt+1 is an iid errormaking theprocess
a random walk.
Table 5
Variance decomposition (Orthodox Taylor).
Unit: % y π Rs r
errIS: 8.9 33.3 93.2 62.8
errPP: 58.8 6.1 4.9 20.8
errR
S
: 16.8 60.1 1.9 16.3
erry⁎: 15.5 0 0 0
errg−t: 0 0 0 0
Total: 100 100 100 100
Table 7
Wald tests of the FTPL and the Orthodox models.
Elements tested FTPL Orthodox
Dynamics (VARX coeff. only) 77.4 (0.226) 78.1 (0.219)
Volatility (VARX resid. only) 6.9 (0.931) 59.3 (0.407)
All elements (VARX coeff. + resid.) 69.3 (0.307) 84.9 (0.151)
Note: p-values in parentheses; p-value = (100−Wald percentile) / 100.
Table 8
Marginal log data likelihood with strong priors.
Selected prior type FTPL model Orthodox model Dominant model
FTPL prior 481.8486 467.4937 FTPL
Orthodox prior 431.16 449.3487 Orthodox
Note: the marginal data likelihoods are calculated using the Laplace Approximation
estimator.
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ue
t ), we can rewrite the above expression
as approximately:
−Δ log πt þ rt
 
− Δ logyt−γΔ logy

t−1−c
y  ¼ Δ log tt−gtð Þ−Δ log rt−γ ð7Þ
Using a ﬁrst-order Taylor Series expansion around the sample
means we can obtain a solution for Δπt as a function of change in
government expenditure and tax rates:
Δπt ¼ κ Δgt−Δttð Þ þ λΔrt−μΔ 1−γLð Þ logyt ð8Þ
where κ ¼ πþ rt−g ;λ ¼
πþγ
r−γ ; μ ¼ π þ r ; π , r , t and g are sample
mean values of the corresponding variables. We can integrate (8) to
obtain:
πt ¼ κ gt−tt
 þ cþ λrt þ μ 1−γLð Þ logyt ð9ÞTable 6
VECM estimates: actual vs model simulations.
VARX
parameter
Actual FTPL lower
yt on
yt−1 −0.2740 −0.2835
πt−1 −0.3808 −0.6171
Rt−1
s −0.3502 −1.9803
(g− t)t−1 0.7864 −1.1111
yt−1⁎ 3.2576 −2.8302
Trend −0.0089 −0.0069
πt on
yt−1 0.3353 −0.5080
πt−1 0.3231 −0.4205
Rt−1
s 1.4273 −1.0472
(g− t)t−1 0.2311 −0.5509
yt−1⁎ −0.5633 −2.7752
Trend 0.0011 −0.0072
Rt
s on
yt−1 −0.0400 −0.1318
πt−1 −0.0424 −0.2102
Rt−1
s 0.7967 −0.0015
(g− t)t−1 0.1672 −0.0162
yt−1⁎ 0.3204 −0.8594
Trend −0.0012 −0.0016
(g− t)t on
yt−1 0.2262 −0.2832
πt−1 0.1545 −0.3164
Rt−1
s −0.3739 −1.0098
(g− t)t−1 0.4939 −0.0605
yt−1⁎ −0.6407 −2.9531
Trend 0.0017 −0.0057
Var(residy) 1.80 × 10 −4 0.85 × 10 −4
Var(residπ) 1.27 × 10 −4 0.70 × 10 −4
Var(residR
S
) 0.10 × 10 −4 0.05 × 10 −4
Var(residg−t) 0.68 × 10 −4 0.18 × 10 −4
a Number lying beyond the lower/upper bound.Tax and spending ratios are assumed to deviate temporarily from
their permanent values according to error processes (which must be
stationary by construction). Thus:
gt−ttð Þ ¼ gt−ttð Þ þ εt ð10Þ
Since by construction a permanent variable follows a random walk,
this gives us:
Δ gt−ttð Þ ¼ Δ gt−ttð Þ þ Δεt ¼ errg−tt ð11Þ
where errtg−t is a stationary error process. We may now note that there
is some unknown error process by which actual inﬂation is related toFTPL upper Ortho.
lower
Ortho.
upper
0.6075 −0.2551 0.6552a
0.4412 −0.6558 0.3253
1.5485 −2.3809 1.0812
0.8224 −1.0967 0.8337
4.1978 −3.0749 4.0808
0.0083a −0.0079 0.0074⁎
0.4997 −0.3631 0.6922
0.4611 −0.4481 0.3925
2.2328 −0.8633 2.5227
1.3441 −0.7512 1.1868
3.6702 −3.4731 3.1963
0.0074 −0.0075 0.0069
0.1130 −0.0591 0.1801
0.0395 −0.1588 0.0612
0.7624⁎ −0.2494 0.9357
0.4026 −0.2041 0.2378
0.9805 −0.8656 0.7144
0.0019 −0.0024 0.0011
0.3034 −0.3041 0.3116
0.2820 −0.2908 0.2658
0.9486 −1.1319 1.0838
0.8618 −0.1124 0.8305
2.7573 −3.2408 2.5242
0.0063 −0.0062 0.0077
3.18 × 10 −4 0.74 × 10 −4 3.09 × 10 −4
2.85 × 10 −4 0.59 × 10 −4 2.89 × 10 −4
0.15 × 10 −4 0.04 × 10 −4 0.13 × 10 −4
1.11 × 10 −4 0.17 × 10 −4 1.15 × 10 −4
Table 9
Comparing the FIML and II estimates.
FTPL model Orthodox
model
Model parameter ML estimates II estimates ML
estimates
II
estimates
θ 2.42 4.07 2.38 1.96
β Fixed at 0.99 Fixed at 0.99
σ 2.13 0.02 2.22 0.46
κ 0.17 0.35 – –
ρ – – 0.84 0.76
ϕπ – – 1.97 1.31
ϕxgap – – 0.19 0.06
δ – – 0.22 0.007
cy⁎ Fixed at
0.0002
Fixed at
0.0002
γ Fixed at 0.99 Fixed at 0.99
Shock persistence (rho's)
errpp 0.96 0.43 0.51 0.42
errIS 0.51 0.64 0.39 0.84
erry⁎ 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.93
errg−t −0.1 −0.1 −0.05 −0.1
errπ 0.36 0.24 – –
errR
S
– – 0.31 0.33
LR percentile 40.8 75.5 76.6 74.4
(p-value) (0.592) (0.245) (0.234) (0.256)
Full Wald
percentile
94.5 69.3 95.4 84.9
(p-value) (0.055) (0.307) (0.046) (0.151)
Note: p-values in parentheses; p-value = (100-reported percentile)/100.
Table 11
P-values of the models: Weighted vs FTPL and Orthodox.
Elements tested FTPL Orthodox Weighted model
Dynamics (VARX coeff. only) 0.226 0.219 0.408
Volatility (VARX resid. only) 0.931 0.407 0.887
All elements (VARX coeff. + resid.) 0.307 0.151 0.562
Note: p-value = (100−Wald percentile) / 100.
209J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218permanent inﬂation: thusπt ¼ πt þ ηt. We use (9) for the determinants
of πt and sincewe cannot observe (λrt⁎+μ(1−γL)logyt⁎)we include this
in the total error process, errtpi, so that ﬁnally our FTPL model for inﬂa-
tion is:
πt ¼ κ gt−ttð Þ þ cπ þ errpit ð12Þ
We can now complete the DSGEmodel by adding a forward-looking
IS curve, derived in the usual way from the household Euler equation
and the goods market-clearing condition, and a New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (following Clarida et al. (1999) as noted earlier):
yt−y

t ¼ Et ytþ1−ytþ1
 
−
1
σ
Rst−Etπtþ1
 þ errISt ð13ÞTable 10
Indirect estimates of the models: Weighted vs FTPL and Orthodox.
Model parameter FTPL Orthodox Taylor Weighted model
θ 4.07 1.96 0.05
β ———–ﬁxed at 0.99———–
σ 0.02 0.46 1.78
κ 0.35 – 0.81
ρ – 0.76 0.78
ϕπ – 1.31 1.84
ϕxgap – 0.06 0.22
δ – 0.007 0.01
cy⁎ ———–ﬁxed at 0.0002———–
γ ———–ﬁxed at 0.99———–
Weight – – 0.58
Shock persistence (rho's)
errpp 0.43 0.42 0.29
errIS 0.64 0.84 0.58
erry⁎ 0.93 0.93 0.95
errg−t −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
errπ 0.24 – –
errR
S
– 0.33 –
errWeightedπ – – 0.22πt ¼ θ yt−yt
 þ βEtπtþ1 þ errPPt ð14Þ
Note that the interest rate in the IS curve, Rts, is the usual short term
rate. Also we can see that since (12) sets inﬂation, (14) will solve for
output and (13) will solve for interest rates. Equilibrium output, yt⁎, is
represented empirically by the Hodrick-Prescott trend in output and es-
timated as an I(1) process, as already noted:
yt−y

t−1 ¼ cy þ γ yt−1−yt−2
 þ erryt ð15Þ
Our candidate FTPL model thus consists of Eqs. (11)-(15), with all
equation errors assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Notice that while
the central bank can be thought of as ‘setting’ the short-term interest
rate, it must do so consistently with (13); it is in this sense that ‘mone-
tary policy’ is endogenous. (12), which drives inﬂation, can be thought
of as a ﬁnancial market equilibrium condition; ﬁnancial markets (in-
cluding the exchange rate which is not explicitly in the model) react
to future ﬁscal trends by forecasting inﬂation and moving asset prices
in line. The model is silent on ‘off-equilibrium’ behaviour: theoretical
critics have seized on this as a problem (e.g Buiter, 1999, 2002). But
the model is not alone in such silence; for example in the standard
open economy model of ﬂoating exchange rates the exchange rate
jumps continuously to clear the foreign exchange market - an equilibri-
um condition - and it simply makes no sense to ask what off-
equilibrium behaviour would be. The same is true here.
3.1. An Orthodox model
In order to test the FTPL model we have set out above, we need to
distinguish it clearly from an alternative ‘orthodox’model, in which ﬁs-
cal policy is Ricardian and monetary policy determines inﬂation. In this
model we make no alteration in our assumptions about ﬁrms and
households. We only alter the behaviour of government. Hence we jet-
tison Eqs. (11) and (12) above, coming from the FTPL, in favour of a Tay-
lor Rule for monetary policy, setting Rts in response to inﬂation and the
output gap, and a Ricardian ﬁscal equation that restores the deﬁcit to
some equilibrium level. Thus in place of these two equations we have:
Rst ¼ 1−ρð Þ rss þ ϕππt þ ϕxgap yt−yt
 h iþ ρRst−1 þ errRSt ð12bÞFig. 10. IRFs - Output (Weighted model).
Fig. 12. IRFs - Nom int. rates (Weighted model).
Fig. 11. IRFs - Inﬂation (Weighted model).
Table 12
Variance decomposition (weighted model).
Unit: % y π Rs r
errIS: 10.8 0.3 2 2.2
errPP: 39.3 34.3 37 40.2
errWeightedπ: 42.3 3.8 33.1 54.6
erry⁎: 3.4 0 0 0
errg−t: 4.3 61.6 27.9 3
Total: 100 100 100 100
210 J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218and
Δ gt−ttð Þ ¼−δ g−tð Þt−1−cg−t  þ errg−tt
0
ð11bÞ
Notice that this last equation implies that the primary ﬁscal surplus
is stationary; this in turn implies that its permanent value does not
move (since if it did it would make the surplus non-stationary). We
are to think of temporary variations in the surplus that do not alter
long-run ﬁscal prospects. Thus in this model monetary policy sets inﬂa-
tion via a Taylor Rule and we assume that the ﬁscal surplus is set to en-
sure ﬁscal solvency given inﬂation, output and interest rates.
Table 1 summarizes the common and distinctive elements of the
two models.
3.2. The method of Indirect Inference
The IImethod used here is that originally proposed inMeenagh et al.
(2009a) and subsequently reﬁned by Le et al. (2011, 2012) usingMonte
Carlo experiments. The approach employs an auxiliary model that is
completely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description
of the data against which the performance of the theory is evaluated in-
directly. Such a description can be summarised either by the estimatedFig. 13. IRFs - Real int. rates (Weighted model).parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we will call
these the descriptors of the data. While these are treated as the ‘reality’,
the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated to ﬁnd its implied
values for them.
II has been widely used in the estimation of structural models
(e.g., Smith, 1993; Gregory and Smith, 1991, 1993; Gourieroux et al.,
1993; Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova, 2005). Here we
make a further use of it, to evaluate an already estimated or calibrated
structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time
series model. In estimation the parameters of the structural model are
chosen such that when this model is simulated it generates estimates
of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual data.
The optimal choices of parameters for the structural model are those
that minimise the distance between a given function of the two sets of
estimated coefﬁcients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of this
function are the actual coefﬁcients, the scores or the impulse response
functions. In model evaluation the parameters of the structural model
are taken as given. The aim is to compare the performance of the auxil-
iary model estimated on simulated data derived from the given esti-
mates of a structural model - which is taken as a ‘true’ model of the
economy, the null hypothesis - with the performance of the auxiliary
model when estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is
correct then its predictions about the impulse responses, moments
and time series properties of the data should statistically match those
based on the actual data. The comparison is based on the distributions
of the two sets of parameter estimates of the auxiliarymodel, or of func-
tions of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves ﬁrst constructing the errors im-
plied by the previously estimated/calibrated structural model and the
data. These are called the structural errors and are backed out directly
from the model equations and the data.4 These errors are then
bootstrapped and used to generate for each bootstrap new data based
on the structural model. An auxiliary time series model is then ﬁtted
to each set of data and the sampling distribution of the coefﬁcients of
the auxiliary time series model is obtained from these estimates of the
auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether
functions of the parameters of the time series model estimated on the
actual data lie in some conﬁdence interval implied by this sampling
distribution.
The auxiliary model should be a process that would describe the
evolution of the data under any relevant model. It is known that for
non-stationary data the reduced form of a macro model is a VARMA
where non-stationary forcing variables enter as conditioning variables
to achieve cointegration (i.e. ensuring that the stochastic trends in the
endogenous vector are picked up so that the errors in the VAR are4 Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here to
initiate the tests is the robust instrumental variables estimation suggested by McCallum
(1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data as instruments and cal-
culate the ﬁtted values from the VAR we use as the auxiliary model in what follows`Once
the search procedure (effectively indirect estimation) has converged on the best model
parameters, we then move to generating the expectations exactly implied by the param-
eters and the data, and use these to calculate the errors, which are then the exact errors
implied by the model and data. The reason we do not use this ‘exact’ method at the start
is that initially when the model is far from the data, the expectations generated are also
far from the true ones, so that the errors are exaggerated and the procedure may not
converge.
Fig. 14. Structural errors in 1970s (Weighted model).
211J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218stationary). This in turn can be approximated as a VECM - see Appendix
A for details. So followingMeenagh et al. (2012) we use as the auxiliary
model a VECMwhichwe reexpress as a VARX(1) for the fourmacro var-
iables (interest rate, output, inﬂation and the primary budget deﬁcit),
with a time trend and with yt⁎ entered as the exogenous non-
stationary ‘productivity trend’ (these two elements having the effect
of achieving cointegration). Thus our auxiliary model in practice is
given by: yt ¼ ½I−Kyt−1 þ γxt−1 þ gt þ vt where xt−1 is the stochastic
trend in productivity, gt are the deterministic trends, and vt are the
VECM innovations. We treat as the descriptors of the data all the
VARX coefﬁcients and the VARX error variances; we exclude the timeFig. 15. Timeline for output (Weighted model).
Fig. 16. Timeline for inﬂation (Weighted model).trends since we are not concerned with the growth paths. From these
descriptors a Wald statistic may be computed that acts as a test at a
given conﬁdence level of whether the observed dynamics, volatility
and cointegrating relations of the chosen variables are explained by
the DSGE-model-simulated joint distribution of these. This Wald statis-
tic is given by:
Φ− Φ
 0
∑−1ΦΦð Þ Φ− Φ
  ð16Þ
where Φ is the vector of VARX estimates of the chosen descriptors
yielded in each simulation, with Φ and∑(ΦΦ) representing the corre-
sponding sample means and variance-covariancematrix of these calcu-
lated across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of theΦ is obtained by bootstrapping the inno-
vations implied by the data and the theoretical model; it is therefore an
estimate of the small sample distribution.5 Such a distribution is gener-
allymore accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it
is also shown to be consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald
statistic is ‘asymptotically pivotal’; they also showed it had quite good
accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments.6
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters
put forward as the true ones (H0, the null hypothesis); they can be de-
rived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived, the test
then asks: could these coefﬁcients within this model structure be the
true (numerical) model generating the data? Of course only one true
model with one set of coefﬁcients is possible. Nevertheless we may
have chosen coefﬁcients that are not exactly right numerically, so that
the same model with other coefﬁcient values could be correct. Only
when we have examined the model with all coefﬁcient values that are
feasible within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For
this reason we extend our procedure by a further search algorithm, in
whichwe seek other coefﬁcient sets that minimise theWald test statis-
tic - in doing this we are carrying out indirect estimation. The indirect
estimates of the model are consistent and asymptotically normal, in
common with full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates5 The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correla-
tions between the innovations are preserved.
6 Speciﬁcally, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just
over 2% at the 95% conﬁdence level and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh et al. (2012) found
even greater accuracy in Monte Carlo experiments on nonstationary data.
Fig. 17. Timeline for nom. Int. rates (Weighted model).
Table 14
P-values of the models: weighted vs FTPL and Orthodox (1979–1990).
Elements tested FTPL Orthodox Weighted model
Dynamics (VARX coeff. only) 0.083 0.16 0.272
Volatility (VARX resid. only) 0.493 0.886 0.669
All elements (VARX coeff. + resid.) 0.115 0.227 0.365
Note: p-value = (100−Wald percentile) / 100.
212 J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218- see Smith (1993); Gregory and Smith (1991, 1993); Gourieroux et al.
(1993); Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each
model using a powerful algorithm based on Simulated Annealing (SA)
due to Ingber (1996) in which search takes place over a wide range
around the initial values, with optimising search accompanied by ran-
dom jumps around the space. We ﬁnd this algorithm, designed to
avoid local minima in a procedure similar to processes used to cool
steel, improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm.
Our estimationmethod involves taking an initial calibrated set of model
parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals
from the data by the method desribed above, ﬁnd their implied
autoregressive coefﬁcients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the implied
innovations with this full set of parameters to ﬁnd the implied Wald
value. This is then minimised by the SA algorithm. The merit of this ex-
tended procedure is that we are comparing the estimated versions of
each model type when ﬁnally doing our comparison of model compat-
ibility with the data. It should be emphasised that these numerical
methods are a convenient way to compute the Indirect Inference esti-
mates of the model parameters which are presented in the results
which follow.
3.3. Model identiﬁcation
It would be reasonable to ask whether a macroeconomic model of a
few equations like the ones here can be considered to be identiﬁed. Le
et al. (2013) examined this issue for a three-equation New Keynesian
model of the sort being considered here. They found that it was likely
to be heavily over-identiﬁed. Thus there were many more coefﬁcientsTable 13
Indirect estimates of the models: Weighted vs FTPL and Orthodox (1979–1990).
Model parameter FTPL Orthodox Taylor Weighted model
θ 4.29 2.13 4.13
β ———–ﬁxed at 0.99———–
σ 1.79 0.27 0.76
κ 0.1 – 0.31
ρ – 0.81 0.92
ϕπ – 3.67 3.63
ϕxgap – 0.18 0.09
δ – 0.66 0.96
cy⁎ ———–ﬁxed at 0.0005———–
γ ———–ﬁxed at 0.97———–
Weight – – 0.44
Shock persistence (rho's)
errpp 0.53 0.39 0.5
errIS 0.64 0.86 0.83
erry⁎ 0.94 0.94 0.94
errg−t −0.22 0.15 0.44
errπ 0.19 – –
errR
S
– −0.09 –
errWeightedπ – – −0.13in the reduced form than in the structural model; under normal as-
sumptions this should give several sets of estimates of the structural co-
efﬁcients from the reduced form. With enough data these sets would
coincide and so even a partial reduced form should be sufﬁcient to
yield a set of structural parameter estimates. In that paper they went
further and sought to ﬁnd alternative structural parameter sets that
could generate the same reduced form; using indirect inference they
were able to establish that no other sets could exist. These results sug-
gest that we can regard each of the two models here as over-
identiﬁed, implying that there is no chance of confusing the reduced
form of the one with the reduced form of the other.
We can check the identiﬁcation of our two models using exactly the
same method. We carry out a Monte Carlo experiment in which we as-
sume that the FTPL model is true (we give it the same parameters as
those we later estimate for it) and using the FTPL error properties we
generate 1000 samples of data from it (of the same length as in our
1970s sample here - 28 quarters) and calculate the VARX approximate
reduced form from it. We now ask whether any Orthodox model
could generate the same data and hence the same VARX reduced
form, using the indirect inference test at 95% conﬁdence; if indeed it
could do so, thus effectively being the same model, then we would re-
ject exactly the same percent of the time as we reject the true FTPL
model - namely 5%. In fact we reject it for about 25% of the samples;
thus it cannot be the same model (Table 2). We also did the reverse,
and found the same (rejecting it at about the same rate). In doing this
check we have searched over a wide range of parameter values using
the Simulated Annealing algorithm, starting from the estimated
parameters.
This test shows clearly that these two models cannot be confused
with each other under conditions where data availability is not a prob-
lem - i.e., under the asymptotic conditions we assume for identiﬁcation.
Thus they are not ‘observationally equivalent’, even though, aswe show
below, their data representations in VARX form are similar. To distin-
guish them one needs to estimate and test them in full, which we now
go on to do.
4. Data and Test Results for the 1970s
We limit our focus for the 1970s to the period between 1972–1979
duringwhich the FTPL could be a potential candidate given the econom-
ic background. We use unﬁltered (but seasonally adjusted) data from
ofﬁcial sources. We deﬁne as Rts the Bank of England Minimum Lending
Rates, and as πt the percentage change in CPI as per the OECD data, both
in quarterly term. We use for yt the real GDP level in natural logorithm
from theOfﬁce for National Statistics (ONS), and for yt⁎ its trend values as
suggested by the H\\P ﬁlter. The primary deﬁcit ratio g−t is simply the
difference between G/GDP and T/GDP, where G and T are respectivelyTable 15
Variance decomposition (weighted model; 1979–1990).
Unit: % y π Rs r
errIS: 0.5 24.2 82 68.4
errPP: 37.5 13.4 15.1 27.5
errWeightedπ: 1.2 60.1 2.7 4.1
erry⁎: 60.8 0 0 0
errg−t: 0 2.3 0.2 0
Total: 100 100 100 100
Fig. 19. IRFs - Inﬂation (Weighted model).
Fig. 18. IRFs - Output (Weighted model).
213J. Fan et al. / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 203–218the levels of TotalManaged Expenditure and Total Current Receipts also
fromONS. In particular, since for solvency G is required to be less than T
for government bonds to have a positive value, and that government
spending on a capital variety is expected to produce future returns in
line with real interest rates, we deduct the trend in such spending
from the trend inG/GDP, so that the adjustedmeasure of G is TotalMan-
aged Expenditure net of debt-interest payment (‘TMEX’). By
implementing thiswe assume that the average share of expenditure de-
voted to ﬁxed capital, health and education in the period can be
regarded as the (constant) trend in such capital spending; of course
the ‘capital’ element in total government spending is unobservable
and hence our assumption is intended merely to adjust the level of g
in an approximate way but not its movement over time which we re-
gard as accurately capturing changes in such spending. This adjustment
counts for about 10% of GDP. Note that the primary deﬁcit is therefore
negative (i.e. there is a primary surplus throughout). Fig. 1 plots the
time series.4.1. Model results under II
Wenow turn to the empirical performance of the competingmodels
outlined above under II. We summarise the model estimates (by Simu-
lated Annealing) in Table 3 (The Wald test results based on these are
shown in Table 7 in what follows).
The estimates for the two models' shared parameters (θ and σ) are
strikingly different. In the FTPL θ is high and σ is low, implying a steep
Phillips curve and a ﬂat IS curve. Since inﬂation is determined exoge-
nously by the exogenous deﬁcit ratio and its own error process, the
steep Phillips curve (which determines the output gap) implies that
the output gap responds weakly to inﬂation while the ﬂat IS curve
(which sets interest rates) implies that the real interest rate responds
weakly to the output gap. The impulse response functions for the FTPL
model (Figs. 2-5) conﬁrm this.7
Effectively this suppresses most of the simultaneity in the model as
can be seen from the variance decomposition in Table 4. We ﬁnd this
by bootstrapping the innovations of the model repeatedly for the same
sample episode - plainly the variances of non-stationary variables,
while undeﬁned asymptotically, are deﬁned for this (short) sample peri-
od. One sees that inﬂation is disturbed by both the ﬁscal deﬁcit and its
own shock; output by both the productivity trend and the supply
(errPP) shock, with aminimal effect from the inﬂation shock; real interest
rates entirely by its own (errIS) shock; nominal interest rates respond to a
mixture of shocks because they combine inﬂation and real interest rates.
On the other hand, the estimates for the Orthodox model imply a
standard Phillips Curve and also a fairly ﬂat IS curve. The Taylor Rule
has fairly standard New Keynesian responses to inﬂation (1.3) and the
output gap (0.06), implying a ﬂat response of interest rates to output
gap movement. There is also a weak Ricardian ﬁscal plan, with the def-
icit converging extremely slowly (δ=0.007). In this model the macro-7 In this model the effect of IS curve shock on output and inﬂation is nil.economy is orthogonal to the ﬁscal deﬁcit but there is considerable si-
multaneity otherwise. Shocks to demand (IS), supply (PP) and mone-
tary policy (RS) each move all four macro variables in a relatively
normal way, as can be seen from the impulse responses8 (Figs. 6-9)
and also the variance decomposition (carried out just as for the FTPL)
in Table 5. To replicate the data behaviour in this episode, with its
large swings in inﬂation, the model ﬁnds large monetary policy (errR
s
)
shocks which need to be moderated by Taylor Rule interest rate re-
sponses to limit inﬂation variation; these shocks dominate inﬂation var-
iancewhich triggers the Taylor Rule response limiting the effects on real
interest rates and output. Demand (errIS) shocks trigger inﬂation and
Taylor Rule responses, so largely affecting interest rate variance. Supply
(errPP) shocks trigger sharp inﬂation responses which are largely
neutralised by real interest rate responses; these in turn destabilise out-
put, given the ﬂat IS curve.
4.1.1. What do the tests show about the two models?
Wemay now consider the way in which each model replicates the
VARX estimates on the data, as shown in Table 6.
We can see from this Table that eachmodel implies ranges for many
of the VARX coefﬁcients that are fairly similar. However, wemust stress
that that it is their joint distribution that is used in theWald statistic:we
ask via theWald test whether the joint distribution of eachmodel could
contain the joint values found on the data. These tests are shown in
Table 7. They show the percentile of the Wald distribution where the
data-based VARX lies (the ‘Wald percentile’) and also the p-value (=
[100minus this percentile]/100). Plainly the twomodels differ substan-
tially in their ability tomatch the coefﬁcients jointly, with FTPL's p-value
around twice that of the Orthodox.
The table suggests thatwhen themodels are asked toﬁt all elements
of the VARX, both models pass the Wald test at a 95% conﬁdence level,
though the FTPL has a p-value about double that of the Orthodox
model. Hence if we limit ourselves to these two models the FTPL is
rankedwell above the Orthodox for this period. Before we consider fur-
ther how we should react to this result, we consider whether other es-
timation and testing methods can shed more light on the model
rankings.
4.2. Bayesian analysis of the two models
Bayesian estimation methods have become widespread in macro-
modelling and so it is appropriate that we ask what contribution they
can make to our investigation here. There are two main approaches
we can take: with strong priors and with ﬂat or uninformative priors.
In the latter case the Bayesian method becomes FIML and we can use
the Likelihood Ratio in the usual classical manner. In the former the
model posterior likelihood and hence ranking involves both the priors
and the data likelihood. We report the two approaches in turn.8 In this model the effect of deﬁcit errors are nil on output, inﬂation, and both nominal
and real interest rates.
Fig. 21. IRFs - Real int. rates (Weighted model).
Fig. 20. IRFs - Nom. int. rates (Weighted model).
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sen to be in favour of either the FTPL model or the Orthodoxmodel) the
marginal data likelihoods are extremely different from the viewpoint of
ranking the two models based on the Bayes factor. In this case we are
able to obtain a strong ranking of the models on each set of priors; but
the rankings contradict each other, with the priors effectively setting
the rank order. Plainlywe cannot use these estimates to rank themodels
without begging the question of which model and associated priors is
correct.
If we turn to the FIML estimateswhere the priors are ﬂat and so irrel-
evant, we encounter the besetting problem of ﬂat likelihood in small
samples. We obtain model estimates that are quite different from theFig. 22. Structural errors in 1II estimates as we show in (Table 9). Yet when we compute the Likeli-
hood Ratio, LR, of these estimates (against the VARX on the data) we
ﬁnd that both models fail to be rejected by the data on their ML
estimates and furthermore on their II estimates the LR p-values of the
Orthodox model are somewhat higher, suggesting that the ML estima-
tor has great difﬁculty in locating its optimal parameter values. The II es-
timator has much lower small sample bias (Le et al., 2012) and here is
generally better determined than the ML estimator; we use it in what
follows. But the general conclusion from the ML estimates is consistent
with those from the II estimates: that neithermodel is rejected and that
the FTPLmodel is ranked above theOrthodox onML estimates by the LR
p-values, just as it is on II p-values on II estimates.
Our conclusion from these various methods of evaluation is that we
cannot rank the models using strong priors because we obtain contra-
dictory results depending on which priors we use. Wemay use ML esti-
mation (ﬂat priors) and the LR test but this like the II test fails to reject
eithermodel. However, the fact that we cannot reject eithermodel with
any conﬁdence suggest we should look for some model, closer to the
truth, that somehow combines the two models, so accounting for the
fact that both have some truth in them. We now go on to argue that
there is a case for such a model.
5. A combined model?
This was, as should have been clear fromour earlier discussion of the
context, a period of great uncertainty in UK economics and politics; in
1975 there was even a proposal by certain Labour politicians led by
Tony Benn, a leadingminister in the government, to install a siege econ-
omy (effectively to insulate an FTPL strategy from external pressures),
and this was only narrowly defeated within the Labour government. It
may therefore well be that people gave some probability to an FTPL re-
gime continuing and some to an orthodox regime reasserting itself - in
the manner described by Leeper (1991).
Our II results for the twomodels above suggest that inﬂation behav-
iourwas being inﬂuenced by expectations of twopotential regimes each
with a certain probability. Inﬂation in this model equals (today's)
expected inﬂation because no information lag is assumed. Hence we
can think of the FTPL inﬂation equation as showing the inﬂation that
would be expected (and would also occur) at time t if the FTPL regime
was in operation. Similarly for the Orthodox model we can think of
the Taylor Rule equation as deﬁning the inﬂation that would be permit-
ted by the rule (and so would also occur) at prevailing interest rates;980s (Weighted model).
Fig. 23. Timeline for output (Weighted model). Fig. 25. Timeline for nom. Int. rates.
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prevailing. We can therefore create a model in which inﬂation expecta-
tions are governed by the probability-weighted inﬂation rate under the
two regimes; this will be also the actual inﬂation, since actual=expect-
ed. In this model inﬂation will thus be a weighted combination of the
twomodels' inﬂation equations - the FTPL and the Taylor Rule equations
- these are Eqs (12) and (12b) respectively and we now replace them
both with:
πt ¼ WFTPLκ gt−ttð Þ
þ 1−WFTPL 1
ϕπ
1
1−ρð Þ Rt−ρRt−1ð Þ−ϕxgap yt−y

t
 
−α
 
þ errWeightedπt
ð12cÞ
Given that inﬂation is determined by the probability-weighted aver-
age of each regime's own inﬂation outcome, we now have a composite
inﬂation error -which in principle consists of theweighted combination
of the two regime error processes plus any temporary deviations of in-
ﬂation from this weighted combination (e.g. due to variation in the
weight). Since we cannot observe what the inﬂation rate actually was
in each regime, only the average outcome, we can only observe a com-
posite error.
All the other equations are the same, with the exception of the ﬁscal
deﬁcit equation which has an AR coefﬁcient (δ=0.007, as reported in
Table 3) that is so close to zero that it cannot resolve the uncertainty
about which regime is operating; we allow it to be determined by the
model estimation.
When we examine the results of this weighted model (as we report
in Tables 10 and 11 in comparison to the earlier results), we see that it
improves substantially on both models alone, with a p-value almost
double that of the FTPL and almost four times that of the Orthodox.
The model now adopts a very ﬂat Phillips Curve, a steep IS Curve, and
a tough Taylor Rule (with a high response to inﬂation and a moderate
response to the output gap). Given the 0.58 weight on FTPL, the effect
of the FTPL deﬁcit mechanism on inﬂation (now κ×Weight) is a bitFig. 24. Timeline for ination (Weighted model).higher than that in the FTPL model, implying that ﬁscal policy has a
strong inﬂuence still on inﬂation.
The blend of Orthodoxwith FTPL is revealed in the IRFs (Figs. 10-13).
The IS and PP shocks affect the economy much as in the Orthodox case.
A positive weighted inﬂation error is a combination of 1) a direct
temporary shock to inﬂation as in the FTPL model and 2) an easing of
monetary policy in the Taylor Rule error. The ﬁscal shock behaves as
in the FTPL model, strongly affecting inﬂation and nominal interest
rates.
The resulting variance decomposition (Table 12) gives the supply
shock and the weighted inﬂation shocks about an equal role in output
variability - the latter including aswe have seen both themonetary pol-
icy and any exogenous inﬂation shock. These two shocks also share the
main role in real interest rate variability. For inﬂation variability the ﬁs-
cal shock becomes dominant, with the supply shock providing the rest.
Nominal interest rate variability thus reﬂects a roughly similar role for
supply, inﬂation and ﬁscal shocks. What we see here in the weighted
model is that the FTPL inﬂuences remain important.
In the next section we review the implications of this successful
weighted model for the causes of what happened quarter by quarter.
Clearly, huge errors in policy were made, to permit the large rise in
inﬂation and the prolonged recession both to occur during the mid-
1970s. In our ﬁnal concluding section, we reﬂect on the policy lessons
and how they were absorbed subsequently in UK political choices.
6. A time-line of the UK 1970s episode according to the weighted
model
We see ﬁrst the errors backed out period by period in Fig. 14. Begin
with the inﬂation error in the weighted FTPL/Taylor Rule equation. This
is some combination of monetary policy and exogenous inﬂation
(notably commodity price) shocks; the 1973 and 1974 peaks were
both periods of expansionary money and surging commodity prices.
1977's low point corresponds to the IMF visit, which tightened money
sharply. Next, we note that the PP shockmirrors this weighted inﬂation
error closely; this is because with a very ﬂat Phillips Curve movements
in inﬂation are governed almost solely by expected inﬂation for next
quarter; but since the ﬁscal deﬁcit is close to a random walk this turns
out to be very close to current expected inﬂation which too is
dominated by the current ﬁscal deﬁcit. The IS shock turns negative in
the mid-1970s before recovering in the late 1970s. The ﬁscal deﬁcit
shock is large and positive early on before being restrained later in the
period.
In the timeline for output (Fig. 15)we see that all these shocks play a
part; the dominant role, as foreshadowed by our variance decomposi-
tion, is taken by the supply and inﬂation shocks but these essentially
cancel each other out, leaving the IS shock as the factor creating reces-
sion and the productivity shock assisting it in generating later recovery.
For inﬂation (Fig. 16) the ﬁscal shock is the key factor generating the
sharp inﬂation explosion from 1973–5, aided by the supply shock. For
interest rates (Fig. 17), ﬁscal, supply and inﬂation shocks all three are
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move less than one might expect given the sharp rise in inﬂation in
mid-1975; this is consistent with the model's ﬁnding that monetary
policy itself has an inadequate response to inﬂation during the period
(the weight on the Taylor Rule of 0.42 times the inﬂation response of
1.84 is only 0.77).
Thus the overall picture of the period from our weighted model is
that the ﬁscal deﬁcit was a key factor in driving inﬂation expectations
and that monetary policy in practice did little to moderate these;
interest rates varied inadequately. Output was the victim of poor
productivity growth and the demand shocks of the mid-1970s, with
these both improving somewhat later in the period.
From these timelines it is clear that poor expected macro policy
choices, both ﬁscal and monetary, reinforced the bad results already
created by the poor growth of productivity. The two factors together
produced economic results so bad that the British voters backed
Margaret Thatcher's radical policy changes over a whole decade,
embracing not merely macro-policy but also supply-side policy
reforms. Whether the voters would have backed her had the
economy not been in such a parlous condition in 1979 is a matter of
intense interest for political economy but clearly lies well outside the
scope of this paper.
7. Analysis of the 1980s
We now turn to a comparative analysis of the 1980s episode (1979–
1990) in which the Thatcher government changed themacro-economic
policy regime. According to most accounts this sets up an ‘active’mon-
etary policy designed to bear down on inﬂation and a ‘passive’ or
Ricardian ﬁscal policy designed to ensure solvency; another way of ex-
pressing this used in commentary at the time (e.g. Minford, 1980;
Sargent and Wallace, 1981) was that ﬁscal policy should not threaten
monetary policy by undermining conﬁdence in solvency. If these
widely-accepted accounts are correct, we should ﬁnd according to our
empirical II method that the 1980s data give opposite results to
the1970s. We should ﬁnd that the FTPL model performs less well and
that its weight in any weighted model is much smaller while the effect
of ﬁscal behaviour on inﬂation should also be small.
In this section we do not repeat our analysis of Bayesian and ML
estimates, because for the same reasons as in the 1970s these give
unhelpful results. We focus solely on the Indirect Inference estimates
in what follows.
As expected, we ﬁnd from our 1980s estimates that indeed the FTPL
theorywhile not rejected does lesswell than theOrthodox in explaining
the data behaviour; and that the weighted model implies much less of
an effect of ﬁscal policy.
Our results (for data from 1979 to 1990) are shown in Tables 13 to
15. Once again both models fail to be rejected. But now the Orthodox
model is ranked higher than the FTPL model by p-value. Also the
weighted model again has a p-value substantially greater than either
single model, this time nearly double that of the Orthodox and nearly
four times that of the FTPL. We can conclude from this that in spite of
the new government's announced intentions uncertainty remained
about the two regimes and whether speciﬁcally ﬁscal policy would re-
main under control. The weight on the FTPL regime remained as high
as 0.44.
Thus it might appear that the 1980s were not so different as widely
thought from the 1970s. Nevertheless, the effect of the ﬁscal deﬁcit on
the economy fades from the picture in the weighted model. Its direct
effect on inﬂation (κ×Weight) falls from 0.47 in the 1970s to 0.14
in the 1980s. In the variance decomposition its role in inﬂuencing
the economy's behaviour virtually disappears, its share of inﬂation
variance falling to 2.3% and of nominal interest rate variance to
0.2% (See also the impulse responses as we summarise in Figs. 18
to 21). We can interpret this as implying that although people were
worried that ﬁscal policy might matter for inﬂation resurgence andhence assigned it a role, in practice its behaviour was tightly
controlled so that these fears were not realised. At the same time the
‘monetarist’ tag attached to the new government is borne out by the
high monetary response to inﬂation (this being [1−Weight]×ϕπ=
2.03).
Interestingly, this interpretation is reinforced by the well-known
nervousness about ﬁscal deﬁcits of the Thatcher government, famously
exhibited in the controversially tight 1981 budget. In effect the Thatcher
ministers were deeply concerned to lay to rest doubts about their ﬁscal
policy intentions so that their perceived monetary toughness towards
inﬂation would not be undermined.
What we see in the model behaviour (via decomposing the effect
of historical shocks, as in Figs. 22 to 25) on the 1980s is a much di-
minished role of ﬁscal shocks on the economy, brought about by
the change in regime towards the greater dominance of orthodox
monetary policy which keeps inﬂation under tighter control. As a re-
sult the inﬂationary shock no longer affects output or interest rates
much, by contrast with the 1980s when it was the dominant factor
disturbing them.
8. Conclusions
In this paperwe have examined an episode of UK history, the 1970s,
when ﬁscal policymay have been setwithout thought for future solven-
cy implications andmonetary policy may have been entirely accommo-
dative - a case of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). Because the
data implications of this theory are qualitatively similar to those of the
Orthodox theory in which monetary policy is set by a Taylor Rule to
hit an inﬂation target and ﬁscal policy is set to achieve solvency at
that inﬂation rate, we have set up the two theories as rival structural
models and tested each against the behaviour found in the data, by
the method of Indirect Inference (our efforts to use Bayesian or Maxi-
mum Likelihood estimation could not distinguish so convincingly be-
tween the two models). Our ﬁnding is that neither model is rejected
by the data but that the FTPL model can account much better for the
data behaviour than the Orthodox; nevertheless by far the best account
of the period assumes that expectations were a probability-weighted
combination of the two regimes. The policies pursued in this episode
generated generally high as well as volatile inﬂation, together with
weak productivity growth and a long-lived recession. They paved the
way for a decisive change of approach to bothﬁscal andmonetary policy
after the election of 1979. However we also found when examining the
1980s that there remained a considerable degree of policy uncertainty
so that expectations aboutﬁscal policy continued to play a key role; ner-
vousness about this inﬂuenced the Thatcher government's policies to
bringﬁscal deﬁcits down steadily so that in practice the role ofﬁscal pol-
icy in the economy's behaviour was minimised. In sum the evidence of
these two decades of UK history suggest that ﬁscal deﬁcits were key to
the macro-economic crises of the 1970s and bringing them under
control was important, alongside tighter monetary policy, in restoring
stability in the 1980s.
Appendix A. VECM/VARX representation of a DSGE model
Following Meenagh et al. (2012), we can say that after log-
linearisation a DSGE model can usually be written in the form
A Lð Þyt ¼ BEtytþ1 þ C Lð Þxt þ D Lð Þet ðA1Þ
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables
which we assume are driven by
Δxt ¼ a Lð ÞΔxt−1 þ dþ c Lð Þεt : ðA2Þ
The exogenous variables may contain both observable and
unobservable variables such as a technology shock. The disturbances
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yt and xt are non-stationary. L denotes the lag operator, thus, zt−s=
Lszt, and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial functions with roots outside
the unit circle.
The general solution of yt is
yt ¼ G Lð Þyt−1 þ H Lð Þxt þ f þM Lð Þet þ N Lð Þεt : ðA3Þ
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt
and xt are non-stationary, the solution has the p cointegration relations:
yt ¼ I−G 1ð Þ½ −1 H 1ð Þxt þ f½ 
¼ Πxt þ g:A4
ðA4Þ
The long-run solution to the model is
yt ¼ Πxt þ g
xt ¼ 1−a 1ð Þ½ −1 dt þ c 1ð Þξt½ 
ξt ¼ Σt−1i¼0 εt−s
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt ¼ xDt þ xSt has a
deterministic trend xDt ¼ ½1−að1Þ−1dt and a stochastic trend xSt ¼
½1−að1Þ−1cð1Þξt .
The solution for yt can therefore be re-written as the VECM:
Δyt ¼− I−G 1ð Þ½  yt−1−Πxt−1ð Þ þ P Lð ÞΔyt−1 þ Q Lð ÞΔxt þ f þM Lð Þet
þ N Lð Þεt ¼− I−G 1ð Þ½  yt−1−Πxt−1ð Þ þ P Lð ÞΔyt−1 þ Q Lð ÞΔxt
þ f þωtA5 ωt ¼ M Lð Þet þ N Lð Þεt
ðA5Þ
Hence, in general, the disturbance ωt is a mixed moving
average process. This suggests that the VECM can be approximated by
the VARX:
Δyt ¼ K yt−1−Πxt−1ð Þ þ R Lð ÞΔyt−1 þ S Lð ÞΔxt þ g þ ζ t ðA6Þ
where ζt is an i . i .d. zero-mean process.
As
xt ¼ xt−1 þ 1−a 1ð Þ½ −1 dþ εt½ 
the VECM can also be written as:
Δyt ¼ K yt−1−yt−1ð Þ−Π xt−1−xt−1ð Þ½  þ R Lð ÞΔyt−1 þ S Lð ÞΔxt þ hþ ζ t :
ðA7Þ
Either Eqs. (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliarymodel. Herewe focus
on (A7); this distinguishes between the effect of the trend element in x
and the temporary deviation from its trend. In ourmodels these two el-
ements have different effects and so should be distinguished in the data
to allow the greatest test discrimination.
It is possible to estimate (A7) in one stage by OLS. Meenagh et al.
(2012) do Monte Carlo experiments to check this procedure and ﬁnd
it to be extremely accurate.
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